Moral Disengagement: Significance

The existence of moral disengagement shows that some moral intuitions are, at least in part, consequences of reasoning from known principles. It also appears to be a source of objections to each of the theories of moral intuitions we have so far considered, as well as (to anticipate) to Greene’s dual-process theory.

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Notes

We have understood the theory of moral disengagement and seen evidence that it occurs and can explain an interesting range of morally-relevant judgements and actions. No doubt, then, that it is interesting for its own sake. But why are we focussing on it at this point in the course on moral psychology?

The existence of moral disengagement shows that some moral intuitions are, at least in part, consequences of reasoning from known principles.¹

UPDATE 2: This is incorrect. Many or all of the principles typically used in moral disengagement are false. (Thank you Isabel!) For instance, it is untrue that ‘Some people have to be treated roughly because they lack feelings that can be hurt’ (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). They cannot therefore be know. What I should have written is this:

The existence of moral disengagement shows that some moral intuitions are, at least in part, consequences of reasoning from principles which the reasoner can articulate.¹

UPDATE 1: This claim does not imply that moral intuitions are ever conclusions of reasoning from known principles (thank you Emily H). Since we defined moral intuitions as unreflective, this would be a contradiction. The claim, rather, is that moral intuitions are consequences of reasoning in this sense: People sometimes anticipate that they will have certain moral intuitions and reason from known principles in order to avoid having them. (This is illustrated with the Tale of the Great and Glorious Leader near the start of Question Session 03.)

Because moral disengagement is implicated in a wide range of inhumane actions, from small-scale bullying (Pelton, Gound, Forehand, & Brody, 2004) through executions of individuals (Osofsky, Bandura, & Zimbardo, 2005) to the use of military force where civilian casualties are expected (McAlister, Bandura, & Owen, 2006), its effects cannot be dismissed as marginal. Invoking moral disengagement is unlike observing that philosophers sometimes reason about ethical dilemmas.

The role of reason in moral disengagement—and therefore in moral intuition—is incompatible with views on which ‘basic values are implemented in our psychology in a way that puts them outside certain practices of justification’ (Prinz, 2007, p. 32). It is also incompatible with the view that ‘moral reasoning is […] usually engaged in after a moral judgment is made, in which a person searches for arguments that will support an already-made judgment’ (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, p. 189).^2,3

Moral disengagement indicates that reasoning often functions to support moral intuitions in ways that do not provide justification (because the reasoning is so bad; e.g. ‘Kids who get mistreated usually do things that deserve it’ (Bandura et al., 1996, p. 374)).⁴ Although not directly our concern in moral psychology, this may be a source of objections to theories of moral intuitions based on analogies with language (for example, Mikhail, 2007).

In short, moral disengagement appears to be a source of objections to each of the theories of moral intuitions we have so far considered.

Glossary

References