Moral Attributes Are Inaccessible

Sinnott-Armstrong, Young, & Cushman (2010, p. §2.1) argue that moral attributes are inaccessible. What is their argument, and does it work?

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Notes

The canonical argument for the hypothesis that the Affect Heuristic explains moral intuitions depends on the premise that moral attributes are inaccessible (see The Affect Heuristic and Risk: A Case Study).

Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (2010, p. 257) are blunt:

‘Inaccessibility creates the need for a heuristic attribute’

These authors therefore claim to show (in Sinnott-Armstrong et al., 2010, p. §2.1) that:

‘no plausible theory [of in what moral attributes consist] will make moral wrongness accessible’ Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (2010, p. 257).

Aside on Implications of the Affect Heuristic

In Why Is the Affect Heuristic Significant?, I noted this claim:

‘if moral intuitions result from heuristics, [… philosophers] must stop claiming direct insight into moral properties’ (Sinnott-Armstrong et al., 2010, p. 268).

But we have seen (in The Affect Heuristic and Risk: A Case Study) that the only available strategy for establishing for hypothesis that moral intuitions result from heuristics requires, as a premise or lemma, that moral attributes are inaccessible. We cannot, therefore, regard this as an implication of that hypothesis. At least not unless we can find some further, as yet unknown, route to establishing it.

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