Conclusion: Guesses Aren’t Evidence
Discoveries in moral psychology reveal that not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios cannot be used in ethical arguments insofar as the arguments aim to establish knowledge of their conclusions.
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Notes
We have been exploring whether a loose reconstruction of an argument (as outlined in Greene contra Ethics (Railgun Remix)) succeeds in establishing that not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios cannot be used in ethical arguments insofar as the arguments aim to establish knowledge of their conclusions.
It does.
Glossary
Claims made on the basis of perception (_That jumper is red_, say) are typically not-justified-inferentially.
Why not just say ‘noninferentially justified’? Because that can be read as implying that the claim is justified, noninferentially. Whereas ‘not-justified-inferentially’ does not imply this. Any claim which is not justified at all is thereby not-justified-inferentially.