Framing Effects: Emotion and Order of Presentation

Rini (2013) and Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) use evidence of framing effects to argue against relying on noninferentially justified judgements. These arguments appear attractive: if successful, they establish dramatic conclusion without requiring much understanding of the processes underpinning judgements. But are they successful?

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Can Ethical Judgements be Noninferentially Justified?

Some philosophers rely on ethical premises for which there is no inferential justification (the premises are not inferred from known ethical principles, for example; nor from observations about patterns of judgements or theories about the causes of judgements). For instance, as we saw in Thomson’s Other Method of Trolley Cases, Thomson (1976) relies without inferential justification on the premise that there is a morally relevant difference between David and Edward.

Sinnott-Armstrong attempts to use framing effects to establish that:

‘no moral intuitions are justified noninferentially’ (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008a, p. 74)

The core of his argument (as I understand it) is this:

‘Evidence of framing effects makes it reasonable for informed moral believers to assign a large probability of error to moral intuitions in general and then to apply that probability to a particular moral intuition until they have some special reason to believe that the particular moral intuition is in a different class with a smaller probability of error’ (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008b, p. 99).

Here ‘moral intuitions’ are supposed to include Thomson’s carefully considered judgement that there is a morally relevant difference between David and Edward (so they are not moral intuition in the sense we considered earlier in this course). I take the target of the argument to be reflective judgements for which there is no inferential justification.

Further support for the claim that ‘no moral intuitions are justified noninferentially’ comes from Rini (2013). She describes her conclusion as ‘very similar’ (p.~266) to Sinnott-Armstrong (2008b)’s. But whereas Sinnott-Armstrong argues that framing effects prevent us from knowing ethical judgements which are not inferentially justified, Rini argues that framing effects prevent philosophers from knowing whether their noninferentially justified judgements are sensitive only to ethically relevant factors.¹

Is Sinnott-Armstrong (2008a)’s or Rini (2013)’s argument successful?

Does the evidence of framing effects successfully undermine the view that, as things stand, philosophers’ noninferentially justified moral judgements can yield knowledge?

What Is a Framing Effect?

Suppose you are asked to judge whether an object is near or far from you. You might be surprised to discover that your judgements can be influenced by whether another person is in the scene and able to interact with the object (Fini, Brass, & Committeri, 2015). After all, the judgement you are making is supposed to be about the distance between you and an object; the distance from another person and that person’s ability to interact with the object are irrelevant considerations.

This an example of a framing effect: task-irrelevant features of a situation systematically influence your performance.

Are Philosophers Subject To Framing Effects When Considering Ethical Scenarios?

Schwitzgebel & Cushman (2015) show that they are subject to order-of-presentation effects (they make different judgements depending on which order trolley scenarios are presented).

Wiegmann, Horvath, & Meyer (2020) show that they are subject to irrelevant additional options: like lay people, philosophers will more readily endorsing killing one person to save nine when given five alternatives than when given six alternatives. (These authors also demonstrate order-of-presentation effects.)

Wiegmann & Horvath (2020) show that they philosophers are subject to the ‘Asian disease’ framing used in a famous earlier study (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). (They also find an indication that philosophers, although susceptible to other framing effects, may be less susceptible than lay people to four other framing effects, including whether an outcome is presented as a loss or a gain (which they term ‘Focus’).)

Emotion

The emotional state of a philosopher making a moral judgement is surely a morally irrelevant factor. That is, how morally bad an action is cannot plausibly depend on how you, as a bystander with narrowly philosophical concerns, feel about it.

There is evidence that your feelings can influence your judgements (as we saw in PS: Does emotion influence moral judgment or merely motivate morally relevant action?).

Does this evidence support Rini’s and Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge to the view that, as things stand, philosophers’ noninferentially justified moral judgements can yield knowledge?

Suppose you discovered that your emotions can influence your judgements about how far away something was. The sadder you feel, the further rewards seem and the closer threats seem.² Under what circumstances would this imply that you could not gain knowledge on the basis of noninferentially justified judgements concerning distance?

Or, alternatively, suppose that you discovered that your judgements about an object’s market value were strongly influenced by your feelings about the object, irrespective of where these feelings had any bearing on its market value. Under what circumstances would this imply that you could not gain knowledge on the basis of noninferentially justified judgements concerning market value?

These are difficult questions to answer. More information is needed. We need to know, for instance, how strong the effects on judgement are; how the emotions interact with other factors affecting judgements; and whether emotions sometimes or never play a role in improving the accuracy of judgements.

According to Kahneman (2013), there are some instances in which

‘there is no underlying preference that is masked or distorted by the frame. Our preferences are about framed problems, and our moral intuitions are about descriptions, not about substance’ (Kahneman, 2013).

If also true in cases of moral judgement, this would clearly support Rini’s and Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge to the view that, as things stand, philosophers’ noninferentially justified moral judgements can yield knowledge.³ But as far as I know, we do not have sufficient evidence either way.

I suggest that framing effects on judgements about moral scenarios have much the same epistemic and normative significance as framing effects on judgements about distance or monetary value.

Order-of-Presentation

The order in which a philosopher considers scenarios is surely a morally irrelevant factor. That is, how morally bad an action is cannot plausibly depend on in which order you, a bystander with narrowly philosophical concerns, consider it.

Philosophers’ ethical judgements about scenarios are influences by order-of-presentation effects (Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2015; Wiegmann et al., 2020).

Does this evidence support Rini’s and Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge to the view that, as things stand, philosophers’ noninferentially justified moral judgements can yield knowledge?

The answer may depend in part on why there are order-of-presentation effects. Wiegmann & Waldmann (2014) offer evidence for the theory that this effect is a consequence of one scenario selectively highlighting an aspect of the causal structure of another scenario. It is possible that, rather than undermining the use of noninferentially justified judgements, Thomson might regard her approach as vindicated. By contrasting the dilemmas, she has identified a morally-relevant difference.

Conclusion

An argument from framing effects against relying on noninferentially justified judgements initially appeared attractive. It appeared to offer a dramatic conclusion while not requiring much understanding of the processes underpinning judgements.

I am unable to find a convincing argument which relies on evidence of framing effects alone for Rini’s and Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge. Wiegmann & Horvath (2020)’s finding that ‘expert ethicists have a genuine advantage over laypeople with respect to some well-known biases’ suggests that we may not know that the consequences of framing effects on philosophers are extensive enough to undermine claims to knowledge on the basis of noninferentially justified judgements.

In considering framing effects in relation to Thomson’s method of trolley cases, I have failed to find support for the claim that discoveries in moral psychology are relevant to ethics. Perhaps you can do better.

This is not to say that we have vindicated Thomson’s method of trolley cases or reliance on noninferentially justified judgements more generally. I cannot rule out the possibility that Kahneman (2013) is right and if we could remove framing effects entirely there would be nothing that noninferentially justified judgements (however reflective) are about. If Kahneman is right, this would support Rini’s and Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge to the view that, as things stand, philosophers’ noninferentially justified moral judgements can yield knowledge.

And even without accepting Kahneman’s position, when we look beyond framing effects we may find alternative grounds to challenge the view that philosophers’ noninferentially justified moral judgements can yield knowledge.

In considering framing effects, we are focussing on individual factors which influence judgement in isolation from each other. To make progress we need a deeper understanding of the causes of ethical judgements.

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